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THE THREE PHASES OF MEAD 
Kristin E. Hickman* 
 
O, swear not by the moon, the inconstant moon, 
That monthly changes in her circle orb, 
Lest that thy love prove likewise variable.1 
 
Though this be madness, yet there is method in‘t.2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
No symposium entitled ―Chevron at 30‖ would be complete without 
some consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court‘s subsequent decision in 
United States v. Mead Corp.3  As Thomas Merrill and I documented years 
ago, in the years leading up to Mead, courts were in substantial disarray 
over which agencies and actions were eligible for Chevron‘s requirement of 
strong, mandatory deference.4  Some disagreements concerned the nature 
and scope of agency authority.  For example, the federal circuit courts were 
divided over whether an agency that lacked the power to adopt legislative 
rules could claim Chevron deference for its statutory interpretations.5  Other 
questions focused on the formats agencies used to communicate their 
interpretations.  Regulations adopted through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking seemed obviously Chevron-eligible, as Chevron itself 
concerned such a rule.6  Courts were less clear, however, about the 
eligibility for Chevron review of agency adjudications or rules that lacked 
 
*  Harlan Albert Rogers Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.  I am 
grateful to participants at the Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward 
Symposium held at Fordham University School of Law and the University of Minnesota 
Law School‘s Squaretable speaker series for helpful feedback, and also to Caitlinrose Fisher 
and Peter Graham for research assistance.  Thank you also to Peter Shane, Chris Walker, and 
the Fordham Law Review for organizing and hosting the symposium. 
 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET act 2, sc. 2. 
 2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2. 
 3. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & 
Christopher J. Walker, Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (2014). 
 4. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 
(2001). 
 5. Id. at 849 n.83 (documenting the circuit split). 
 6. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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notice and comment procedures, like proposed rules, interpretative rules, or 
interim rules.7 
Also, for many years after Chevron, it was not altogether clear whether 
the Chevron standard of review had wiped out preexisting judicial 
deference standards.  A few years ago, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer 
empirically demonstrated that the Court did not in fact abandon other 
deference standards after Chevron.8  But Justice Scalia had labeled the 
Court‘s pre-Chevron deference cases anachronistic,9 and some scholars 
seemed inclined to agree.10 
Mead at least partly resolved these issues by declaring Chevron‘s reach 
to be limited, both by identifying congressional delegation as the premise 
guiding Chevron‘s scope and by unequivocally resurrecting the standard of 
review articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.11 as the alternative where 
Chevron does not apply.12  Yet for many courts and commentators, Mead 
has proven just as confusing and controversial as Chevron.  As the sole 
dissenter in Mead, Justice Scalia has never liked its holding, railing against 
it in opinion after opinion.13  Scholars have criticized Mead and its progeny 
as ―unfortunate,‖ ―flawed,‖ and ―incoherent‖;14 a ―mess‖;15 ―complicated,‖ 
―unclear,‖ and ―prone to results-oriented manipulation.‖16 
 
 7. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 849–52 (listing fourteen areas of pre-Mead 
judicial disagreement, inconsistency, and confusion regarding Chevron‘s scope). 
 8. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083 (2008). 
 9. Although Justice Scalia is perhaps best known for making this declaration in his 
concurring opinion in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
concurring), he actually expressed similar thoughts much, much earlier. See EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259–60 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Antonin Scalia, 
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 
(declaring that Chevron replaced preexisting deference standards with ―an across-the-board 
presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant‖). 
 10. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 984, 1024 (declaring that Chevron ―swept aside‖ existing factors ―for determining the 
extent of deference‖). 
 11. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 12. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 13. See, e.g., id. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that Mead‘s ―consequences 
will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad‖); Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1018 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that Mead and 
Brand X both ―create[] many uncertainties to bedevil the lower courts‖); United States v. 
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1847 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment) (continuing to criticize the line of jurisprudence including Mead 
and Brand X for ―creat[ing] confusion and uncertainty‖). 
 14. Adrian Vermeule, Introduction:  Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 
347 (2003) (considering D.C. Circuit decisions in the term immediately following Mead). 
 15. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2005) (examining court of appeals decisions applying Mead 
and concluding that Justice Scalia ―actually understated the effect of Mead‖). 
 16. Amy Wildermuth, What Twombly and Mead Have in Common, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 276, 277–78 (2008).  In this symposium, a number of contributors continue this 
debate about Mead and Chevron Step Zero. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the 
Roberts Court:  Still Failing After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 741–43 
(2014); Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 
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Some are critical of Mead because they believe it to be premised on a 
fiction that Congress actually thinks about judicial deference in drafting 
statutes.17  More recent empirical research by Lisa Bressman and Abbe 
Gluck suggests that the practices and intentions of congressional staffers 
charged with drafting legislation strongly support the intuitions driving 
Mead as well as Chevron—that Congress often but does not always intend 
to delegate primary interpretive responsibility to administering agencies 
rather than courts.18 
Separately, courts and scholars have struggled with Mead‘s application at 
times, for a couple of reasons.  After initially articulating a relatively rule-
like two-part test for determining the scope of Chevron‘s applicability, the 
Mead Court waffled over which agency actions would or would not satisfy 
that test—an equivocation that was simply destined to yield disagreement, 
particularly as the lower courts endeavored to apply Mead across a variety 
of circumstances.19  Subsequently, the Court‘s rhetoric about Mead has 
been inconsistent, sowing confusion and raising doubts about the Court‘s 
enduring commitment to Mead and its theoretical underpinnings.20 
Stepping back, however, two aspects of the Court‘s Mead jurisprudence 
explain much of the difficulty.  First, as Thomas Merrill has observed, 
Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore are meta-standards, meaning that the justices 
can disagree over how these standards work or even which to apply but still 
agree to accept or reject an agency‘s particular statutory interpretation in a 
given case.21  While commentators may analyze and critique every snippet 
 
756–58 (2014); Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 792–93 
(2014). 
 17. See, e.g., Michael Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux:  Mead and the Shrinking 
Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 679–80 (2002) (―Can we reasonably 
believe Congress intended varied levels of deference should be accorded to administrative 
decisions on the basis of the indeterminate, inconsistent, and ambiguous factors weighed by 
the Court in deciding Congress did not intend to accord Chevron deference to the Customs 
Service in its customs rulings?‖). 
 18. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 994 (2013).  Professor Gluck explores the implications of these 
empirical findings further in her contribution to this symposium. Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 
Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
607, 619 (2014).  And, another symposium contribution documents how Congress 
deliberately codified a deference regime different from Chevron in at least once instance. 
Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise with Chevmore Codification, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (2014) (detailing how in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 25b(5)(A) (2012), Congress directed courts to review 
under the Skidmore standard any decision to preempt state law made by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency). 
 19. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (―Thus, the 
overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. That said . . . the want of that 
procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron 
deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was 
afforded.‖). 
 20. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text; infra Part II. 
 21. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine:  Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and 
Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 812–13 (2002). 
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of rhetoric, the justices may be more willing to let minor disagreements 
over dicta go unremarked, rather than write separately over every 
questionable turn of phrase.22  Some of the justices seem profoundly 
uninterested in the theoretical nuances of deference doctrine, which 
admittedly sometimes resemble the old debate over how many angels can 
dance on the head of a pin.  In many cases, minor rhetorical tweaks and 
blurred language may be enough to persuade even justices who are more 
interested in the deference doctrine debate to join opinions in favor of 
outcomes with which they agree.23 
Second, and relatedly, Mead‘s eight-to-one breakdown masked 
tremendous disagreement among the justices regarding the relationship 
between Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore.  As the sole dissenter in Mead, 
Justice Scalia has always disdained the Court‘s holding in that case and 
advocated a Chevron-or-nothing approach to judicial deference.  But the 
remaining justices, all of whom purport to follow Mead, are not of one 
mind.  Opinions written by Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Breyer in Mead‘s 
precursor, Christensen v. Harris County,24 clearly articulated three rather 
than two distinct approaches to Chevron‘s scope.25  Justice Souter‘s 
mushier rhetoric in Mead temporarily papered over much of that divide.  
Beginning in the following term with Barnhart v. Walton,26 however, the 
Court‘s post-Mead jurisprudence reflects the same three-way split exhibited 
in Christensen. 
In this Essay, I explore the three different views of the relationship 
between Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore expressed in the Court‘s Mead 
jurisprudence.  The Court‘s rhetoric cycles among these three views, 
shifting particularly between the Thomas and Breyer views, but 
occasionally reflecting aspects of Justice Scalia‘s approach as well, causing 
tremendous confusion about Mead‘s theoretical parameters.  Yet one of 
these three views, which I refer to as the ―decision tree model,‖ seems most 
prevalent, both at the Supreme Court and, perhaps more significantly, at the 
federal circuit court level.  Overall, the decision tree model, as applied, 
seems to resolve most cases fairly predictably—hence why I think it 
dominates and also makes Mead more workable than its critics suggest.  
The decision tree model is not doctrinally precise, however, and in more 
marginal cases, it is clunky.  In such cases, the more fluid approach 
advocated by Justice Breyer may yield more satisfying outcomes, but at the 
 
 22. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2010) (―[A] Justice, contemplating publication of a separate writing, should always ask 
herself:  Is this dissent or concurrence really necessary?‖); cf. Patricia M. Wald, The 
Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:  Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 
1412–15 (1995) (discussing reasons why judges write concurring or dissenting opinions). 
 23. Cf. Wald, supra note 22, at 1377–80 (discussing ways in which judges negotiate the 
rhetoric of judicial opinions to accommodate one another). 
 24. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 25. See id.; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Agency Action, 9 
ENGAGE:  J. FEDERALIST SOC‘Y PRAC. GRPS. 16, 18–19 (2008) (drawing three rather than two 
distinct views of Chevron‘s scope from opinions written by Justices Thomas, Scalia, and 
Breyer in Christensen). 
 26. 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
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price of the decision tree‘s predictability.  Regardless, recognizing the three 
phases of Mead may help litigants shape their arguments and allow 
commentators to better predict case outcomes. 
I.   A TRILOGY:  CHRISTENSEN, MEAD, AND BARNHART 
As indicated, understanding Mead‘s aftermath requires viewing Mead not 
in isolation but as part of a trilogy of cases consisting of Mead, Christensen 
v. Harris County, and Barnhart v. Walton.  While less prominent than 
Mead, both Christensen and Barnhart significantly influence Mead‘s 
application.  To set up the forthcoming analysis, a review of all three cases 
seems warranted. 
Christensen27 represented the Court‘s initial stab at recognizing that there 
might be significant questions regarding the scope of Chevron‘s 
applicability.  Christensen concerned an interpretation of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act advanced by the Acting Administrator of the Department of 
Labor‘s Wage and Hour Division, first in an opinion letter to the respondent 
and subsequently in an amicus brief to the Court signed by the Solicitor of 
Labor.28  Christensen concerned the same statute and agency as Skidmore,29 
and thus represented a particularly interesting vehicle for addressing the 
continued vitality of the Skidmore standard of review. 
Writing for a majority of six, Justice Thomas recognized that the statute 
was silent on the particular issue at hand but employed textual canons to 
conclude that Harris County‘s interpretation rather than the Department of 
Labor‘s was ―the better reading‖ of the statute.30  From there, however, the 
Court fractured a little further.  Writing now for a bare majority of five, 
Justice Thomas proceeded to comment on the question of deference for the 
Department of Labor‘s opinion letter.  According to Justice Thomas, as 
opposed to notice-and-comment regulations or formal adjudications, 
interpretations advanced in opinion letters, policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines ―lack the force of law‖ and ―do not 
warrant Chevron-style deference.‖31  ―Instead, interpretations contained in 
formats such as opinion letters are ‗entitled to respect‘ under‖ Skidmore.32 
Writing separately, Justice Scalia objected to Justice Thomas‘s assertion 
of Skidmore as a valid standard of review.33  Justice Scalia called Skidmore 
―an anachronism, dating from an era in which we declined to give agency 
interpretations (including interpretive regulations, as opposed to legislative 
rules) authoritative effect.‖34  Instead, while agreeing with Justice Thomas 
as to the better reading of the statute and thus the judgment, Justice Scalia 
 
 27. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 28. Id. at 581; see also Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Christensen, 529 U.S. 576 (No. 98-1167). 
 29. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 30. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 585. 
 31. Id. at 587. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 34. Id. 
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nevertheless described the combination of an opinion letter and an amicus 
brief signed by the Solicitor of Labor as ―the authoritative view of the 
Department of Labor,‖ and thus eligible for review if not deference under 
the Chevron standard.35 
Lastly, Justice Breyer, representing the views of the three dissenting 
justices,36 agreed with Justice Scalia that the agency‘s interpretation was 
―authoritative‖ and arguably worthy of Chevron deference.37  On the other 
hand, Justice Breyer disagreed with Justice Scalia‘s characterization of 
Skidmore.  According to Justice Breyer, ―Chevron made no relevant 
change‖ to Skidmore.38  Rather, Chevron ―simply focused upon an 
additional, separate legal reason for deferring to certain agency 
determinations, namely, that Congress had delegated to the agency the legal 
authority to make those determinations.‖39  Justice Breyer went on to add 
that, in his view, Skidmore ―retain[ed] legal vitality,‖ that courts should 
―continue to pay particular attention in appropriate cases to the experience-
based views of expert agencies[,]‖ and that deference was warranted in the 
case at bar irrespective of the standard applied.40 
Particularly as compared to Mead, Christensen did not initially garner 
much attention, perhaps because the Court was so fragmented as to the 
deference question, or maybe because the Court so quickly signaled its 
intent to revisit the question of Chevron‘s scope the following Term in 
Mead.  The merits of Mead concerned the proper tariff classification and 
duty rate for day planners under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 
United States.41  The Tariff Act of 1930 and regulations adopted by the 
Secretary of the Treasury thereunder charge the Customs Service with 
classifying merchandise and fixing the rate and amount of duty thereon, 
which the Customs Service does by issuing ruling letters.42  In Mead, the 
Mead Corporation challenged a Customs Service ruling letter classifying 
the day planners from a category on which no tariff was imposed to a 
different category subject to a 4 percent tariff.43  In evaluating the deference 
due to the agency‘s interpretation, the Court described the ruling letters as 
quite informal: 
 
 35. Id. at 591. 
 36. Justice Breyer‘s opinion technically was on behalf only of himself and Justice 
Ginsburg. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens dissented separately, in an 
opinion also joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, principally to challenge the majority‘s 
statutory analysis. Id. at 592 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In a footnote, however, Justice 
Stevens added that he agreed fully with Justice Breyer‘s statements regarding Chevron. Id. at 
595 n.2.  Consistently with Justice Breyer‘s opinion, Justice Stevens also cited Skidmore in 
claiming that the Department of Labor‘s interpretation was ―thoroughly considered and 
consistently observed,‖ and thus ―unquestionably merits our respect.‖ Id. at 595. 
 37. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 597. 
 41. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 222–25 (2001). 
 42. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 1500, 1502 (2012); 19 C.F.R. § 177.8 (2012). 
 43. Mead, 533 U.S. at 224–25. 
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Any of the 46 port-of-entry Customs offices may issue ruling letters, and 
so may the Customs Headquarters Office . . . .  Most ruling letters contain 
little or no reasoning, but simply describe goods and state the appropriate 
category and tariff.  A few letters, like the Headquarters ruling at issue 
here, set out a rationale in some detail.44 
The Court noted further that the different Customs offices issue between 
10,000 and 15,000 such letters each year, and that the governing statute 
does not distinguish Headquarters letters from port-of-entry office letters as 
a matter of law.45 
Noting that it had granted certiorari specifically to address Chevron‘s 
scope, the Court in Mead—with Justice Souter writing on behalf of eight 
justices—held ―that administrative implementation of a particular statutory 
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force 
of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.‖46  The Court did not 
elaborate on what it meant by ―the force of law,‖ but observed that 
―[d]elegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an 
agency‘s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional 
intent.‖47  Later in the opinion, the Court returned to that same theme, 
recognizing ―a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron 
treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process 
of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which 
deference is claimed.‖48  Here the Court cited EEOC v. Arabian American 
Oil Co.,49 which concerned an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission interpretation of Title VII, as an instance in which Congress 
had not delegated the power to ―promulgate rules or regulations.‖50  The 
Court elaborated further that ―[i]t is fair to assume generally that Congress 
contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides 
for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the 
fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such 
force.‖51  Having placed such emphasis on procedure, however, the Court 
then equivocated.  ―That said, and as significant as notice-and-comment is 
in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure here does not 
decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron 
deference, even when no such administrative formality was required and 
none was afforded.‖52  For this, the Court cited as an example53 
 
 44. Id. at 224 (footnotes omitted). 
 45. Id. at 233–34. 
 46. Id. at 226–27. 
 47. Id. at 227. 
 48. Id. at 229. 
 49. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
 50. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–30 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 
(1976)). 
 51. Id. at 230. 
 52. Id. at 230–31. 
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NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.,54 in 
which the Court had extended Chevron deference to an informal 
adjudication by the Comptroller of the Currency interpreting the National 
Bank Act.55 
Applying this analysis to the case at bar, the Court concluded that while 
Congress had given the Customs Service the authority to adopt regulations 
with the force of law, Congress had not intended for Customs Service ruling 
letters to carry such force—notwithstanding the Tariff Act‘s use of the term 
―binding‖ in describing such rulings56 and the potential that such rulings 
might have some precedential value for later transactions.57  In particular, 
the Court noted that ―a letter‘s binding character as a ruling stops short of 
third parties,‖ that ―Customs has regarded a classification as conclusive 
only as between itself and the importer to whom it was issued,‖ and that 
―[o]ther importers are in fact warned against assuming any right of 
detrimental reliance.‖58  Ultimately, therefore, the Court analogized the 
Customs Service ruling letter to the ―policy statements, agency manuals, 
and enforcement guidelines‖ that Christensen had placed ―beyond the 
Chevron pale.‖59  As in Christensen, however, the Court recognized the 
continued vitality of Skidmore and its myriad factors.60  Having concluded 
that Customs Service ruling letters lacked the force of law, therefore, the 
Court remanded the case for reconsideration using the appropriate 
standard.61 
Reacting even more strongly than in Christensen, Justice Scalia dissented 
in an opinion that was scathing in its tone.  He again asserted that Chevron 
called for deference to all ―authoritative‖ agency interpretations of statutes, 
and thus that Mead made ―an avulsive change in judicial review of federal 
administrative action.‖62  He derided Skidmore as ―th‘ol‘ ‗totality of the 
circumstances‘ test,‖63 ―an empty truism,‖64 as well as an ―anachronism.‖65  
He criticized what he labeled as ―[t]he Court‘s new doctrine‖ as ―neither 
sound in principle nor sustainable in practice,‖66 ―absurd,‖67 and ―not at all 
 
 53. Id. at 231. 
 54. 513 U.S. 251 (1995). 
 55. Id. at 256–57, 264. 
 56. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231–32 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (2012)). 
 57. Id. at 232 (―[P]recedential value alone does not add up to Chevron entitlement.‖). 
 58. Id. at 233. 
 59. Id. at 234 (citations omitted). 
 60. Id. at 228.  In Mead, the Court not only quoted language from Skidmore emphasizing 
an interpretation‘s thoroughness, validity, and consistency, but also cited Skidmore in favor 
of considering ―the degree of the agency‘s care,‖ ―formality,‖ ―relative expertness,‖ and 
―persuasiveness.‖ Id. (citations omitted).  The Court also spoke of an agency‘s 
―thoroughness, logic, and expertness, [the ruling‘s] fit with prior interpretations, and any 
other sources of weight.‖ Id. at 235. 
 61. Id. at 238–39. 
 62. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 241. 
 64. Id. at 250. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 241. 
 67. Id. at 245. 
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in accord with any plausible actual intent of Congress.‖68  He predicted a 
parade of horribles including ―protracted confusion,‖69 ―an artificially 
induced increase in informal rulemaking,‖70 and ―the ossification of large 
portions of our statutory law.‖71 
Less than a year after the Court decided Mead, Justice Breyer wrote a 
majority opinion in Barnhart v. Walton that picked one of Mead‘s key weak 
spots—specifically, which agency actions lacking notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or formal adjudication might be Chevron-eligible.  Barnhart 
concerned an interpretation of the Social Security Act contained in a 
regulation adopted by the Social Security Administration through notice-
and-comment rulemaking, published in the Federal Register, and 
incorporated in the Code of Federal Regulations.72  Given that pedigree, the 
Court had no difficulty discerning that Chevron provided the appropriate 
standard of review—observing that the agency, ―[a]cting pursuant to 
statutory rulemaking authority, . . . has promulgated formal regulations.‖73  
Applying Chevron, the Court concluded that deference to the agency‘s 
interpretation was appropriate because the statute ―[did] not unambiguously 
forbid the regulation‖ and that ―the Agency‘s construction is ‗permissible‘‖ 
in light of the statute‘s text and goals.74 
Justice Breyer could have ended his analysis there, but he did not.  
Instead, Justice Breyer continued by noting both that ―the Agency‘s 
regulations reflect the Agency‘s own longstanding interpretation,‖ as 
reflected in informal guidance dating back several decades and, also, that 
―Congress has frequently amended or reenacted the relevant provisions 
without change‖75—both elements that courts historically considered in 
conjunction with Skidmore analysis but find less relevant under Chevron.76  
Justice Breyer then suggested that the informal guidance documents alone 
might be eligible for Chevron.77  Of course, the Court in Christensen had 
listed precisely these sorts of documents as ineligible for Chevron review 
given their lack of legal force.78  Justice Breyer minimized Christensen‘s 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 246. 
 71. Id. at 247. 
 72. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) 
(2001), adopted at 65 Fed. Reg. 42774 (2000)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 218–19. 
 75. Id. at 219–20. 
 76. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1248–50 (2007); see also Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 226 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting Breyer‘s emphasis on an 
interpretation‘s longevity and labeling that factor ―an anachronism—a relic of the pre-
Chevron days‖). 
 77. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221 (stating that informal agency interpretations are ―not 
automatically deprive[d]‖ of Chevron deference). 
 78. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000) (―Interpretations such as 
those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, 
and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-
style deference.‖). 
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significance, pointing to Mead‘s equivocation regarding the significance of 
procedure and rejecting Christensen‘s list of guidance documents as 
absolutely prohibiting Chevron deference.79  Finally, Justice Breyer 
culminated his analysis with the following passage that has found its way 
into numerous opinions since: 
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related 
expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration 
of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful 
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of 
time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through 
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.80 
Without backing away from his disdain for the Court‘s decision in Mead, 
Justice Scalia in concurrence challenged this last part of Justice Breyer‘s 
opinion, suggesting that the Court needed to explain further why informal 
guidance could be Chevron-eligible under Mead.81  After all, the informal 
guidance documents that Justice Breyer cited as further support for Chevron 
deference in Barnhart were precisely the sort of pronouncements that 
Justice Thomas described in Christensen as lacking the force of law and, 
thus, ineligible for Chevron deference. 
Knowledgeable commentators quickly noted Justice Breyer‘s 
inconsistency with Christensen as well.  The late Bob Anthony maintained 
that Justice Breyer‘s opinion in Barnhart ―could sow the seeds of grievous 
confusion in the law of Chevron deference‖ by muddying the relative 
clarity of Christensen and Mead.82  The late Charles Koch recognized the 
Court‘s decision in Barnhart as a partial repudiation of Christensen, 
―solidif[ying] Breyer‘s position in Christensen that policymaking within the 
agency‘s delegated authority would have special force even if not 
developed through notice-and-comment rulemaking, i.e. not embodied in a 
legislative rule.‖83  Bill Funk suggested of ―the Court‘s perturbations on 
Chevron/Mead‖ that ―the more you explain it, the more I don‘t understand 
it.‖84  Tom Merrill and Kathryn Watts contended, alternatively, ―that the 
division in Christensen may be more indicative of the lack of consensus 
among the Justices than what the united front in Mead might imply.‖85 
II.   THREE VERSIONS OF MEAD, CHEVRON, AND SKIDMORE 
In all of Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart, eight justices (Justice Scalia 
excepted) embraced a few common intuitions.  The first is that Congress 
 
 79. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 226–27. 
 82. Robert A. Anthony, Keeping Chevron Pure, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 371, 371 (2002). 
 83. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Policymaking, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 375, 400–01 (2002). 
 84. William Funk, Supreme Court News, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2002, at 
8(quoting Mark Twain). 
 85. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:  
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 576 (2002) (citing Barnhart and other 
post-Mead cases). 
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often, but not always, intends for an agency rather than the courts to 
shoulder primary responsibility for filling statutory gaps, and Chevron 
deference is a product of congressional intent.  The second is that agencies 
wear multiple hats, and not every action by an agency or its representatives 
reflects the identification of and deliberate effort to fill a statutory gap in the 
Chevron sense.  Mead in particular framed these intuitions in terms of both 
a holding and a two-part test, which presumably is why Mead dominates the 
discussion of Chevron‘s scope.  But Christensen and Barnhart reflect the 
same intuitions. 
All of that said, the fact that most of the justices sign onto these basic 
intuitions does not mean that they agree about how to apply these principles 
in practice.  Indeed, from the line of cases discussed in Part I,86 different 
approaches to Mead have emerged, feeding the perceptions of doctrinal 
confusion. 
A.   The Decision Tree Model 
One line of cases treats Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore all as separate and 
distinct standards, and each step of Mead and Chevron as (more or less) 
separate and distinct inquiries within those standards.  Mead‘s holding calls 
for a reviewing court to ascertain first whether Congress delegated to the 
agency the power to act with the force of law.87  If the court finds that the 
agency does possess such delegated power, then Mead‘s holding asks 
whether the agency intended to exercise such authority in adopting the 
interpretation at issue.88  If the answer to both Mead questions is 
affirmative, then the reviewing court moves on to apply Chevron‘s two 
steps.  Chevron asks first whether the meaning of the statute is clear, for if it 
is, then the court as well as the agency must give effect to the clearly 
expressed intent of Congress.89  If the statute is ambiguous, then Chevron‘s 
second step asks only whether the agency‘s interpretation is permissible or 
reasonable.90  If the answer to either Mead question is negative, however, 
then the reviewing court applies Skidmore instead.91 
Not all cases follow the steps in precisely this way.  For example, much 
like Chevron, Skidmore at least implicitly involves some inquiry into 
whether or not the statute is clear, with the contextual factors not coming 
into play unless the statute is ambiguous.92  At least theoretically, therefore, 
the Mead steps can arise either as a Step Zero or as a Step One-and-a-
 
 86. See supra Part I. 
 87. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
 90. Id. at 843–44. 
 91. Mead, 533 U.S. at 237–38. 
 92. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 76, at 1280 (documenting the implicit ―step 
one‖ evaluation of statutory ambiguity in many lower court decisions applying Skidmore 
review). 
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Half.93  Courts sometimes seem to collapse Mead‘s two steps into a single 
inquiry of whether Congress intended the particular agency action in 
question to carry the force of law.94  Some courts and scholars maintain 
that, in reality, Chevron has only one step.95  As compared to the relatively 
rule-like Mead and Chevron tests, of course, Skidmore is a classic 
standard—calling on reviewing courts to extend more or less deference to 
the agency depending on the presence or absence of several contextual 
factors96—leading to a fair amount of variability in its application as well.  
Agencies are repeat players before the courts, with the result that courts in 
some cases seem to skip Mead analysis altogether, relying on precedent to 
determine whether Chevron or Skidmore provides the standard of review.97  
In other cases, courts seem to skip all of the steps, concluding based on a 
fairly cursory analysis of the statute that they either would or would not 
 
 93. E.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711–
12 (2011) (considering whether the statute is ambiguous—i.e., Chevron Step One—before 
approaching Mead analysis); see also Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and 
the Review of Agency Discretion:  Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 39–40 (2011) (contending that Mead analysis generally ought to 
come after Chevron Step One); cf. Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron:  A Defense of 
Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 
64 (2000) (describing Christensen‘s similar force-of-law inquiry as an intermediate step after 
Chevron Step One); Peter M. Shane, Ambiguity and Policy Making, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 19, 
32–33 (2005) (advocating a ―Chevron-Mead waltz‖ that begins by asking ―whether the 
statute in question is susceptible to more than one plausible legal reading‖). 
 94. E.g., Wilderness Soc‘y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 
2003), rev’d en banc, 353 F.3d 1051 (characterizing the question as whether a Fish and 
Wildlife Service special use permit ―is the type of agency decision that Congress intended to 
‗carry the force of law‘‖); Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm‘r, 515 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 
2008) (―Mead teaches that Chevron deference is appropriate only in situations where 
‗Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law. . . .‘‖); Air 
Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (―[O]nly those administrative 
interpretations that Congress and the agency intend to have the ‗force of law,‘ . . . qualify for 
Chevron deference.‖). 
 95. Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeuele wrote a rather provocative article by 
that title. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 
VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).  Justice Scalia has expressed sympathy with their argument. United 
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(stating that ―‗Step 1‘ has never been an essential part of Chevron analysis‖ and citing 
Stephenson and Vermeule).  Other courts have followed suit, though to varying degrees. 
E.g., United States v. Garcia-Santana, 743 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 2014) (interpreting 
Supreme Court precedent as ―authoriz[ing] courts to omit evaluation of statutory ambiguity 
on the ground that, ‗if Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any agency 
interpretation contradicting what Congress has said would be unreasonable‘‖ (citations 
omitted)); Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (suggesting merely that Chevron‘s two steps are ―obviously intertwined‖). 
 96. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(deriding Skidmore as ―th‘ol‘ ‗totality of the circumstances‘ test‖); Thomas W. Merrill, 
supra note 21, at 808 (describing Chevron as ―more rule-like‖ and Skidmore as ―more 
standard-like‖). 
 97. E.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2461 (2013) (relying upon 
precedent along with brief Mead citation in applying Skidmore review to EEOC guidance); 
Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1842 (relying upon precedent rather than Mead analysis to 
support Chevron review for Treasury regulation); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 
2011, 2017 (2012) (relying upon precedent in supporting Chevron standard for Board of 
Immigration Appeals interpretation of Immigration and Nationality Act). 
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defer under either Chevron or Skidmore.98  None of these caveats and 
variations dispute, however, the separateness of the analytical steps, which 
can therefore be depicted, one way or another, as a decision tree. 
Figure 1.  The Decision Tree Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many Supreme Court opinions follow a methodical, step-by-step pattern 
consistent with this view of the relationship among Mead, Chevron, and 
Skidmore.  The analysis is frequently quite brief, and even rather rote.  In 
applying Mead, at least, the Court simply looks for provisions in the statute 
 
 98. E.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (―[W]e 
neither defer nor settle on any degree of deference because the [EEOC] is clearly wrong.‖); 
Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002) (―Because we so clearly agree with 
the EEOC, there is no occasion to defer and no point in asking what kind of deference, or 
how much.‖). 
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construction of the 
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at issue giving the agency the power to act in a legally binding way either 
through rulemaking or adjudication, then considers whether the agency did 
just that. 
For example, in Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig,99 a 
unanimous Court recognized first that the Truth in Lending Act gives the 
Federal Reserve Board authority to adopt binding regulations, and also that 
the challenged regulations (which were adopted using notice-and-comment 
rulemaking) were therefore eligible for Chevron review.100  The Court then 
proceeded to declare the relevant statutory language to be ambiguous at 
Chevron Step One101 and the interpreting regulation reasonable at Chevron 
Step Two.102  Similarly, in United States v. Eurodif S.A.,103 a unanimous 
Court recognized separately first that the Tariff Act of 1930 gives the 
Department of Commerce the authority to act with legal force, and then that 
the Commerce Department exercised that authority through adjudication, 
before turning finally to Chevron‘s two steps to consider the statutory 
interpretation at issue.104  The Court‘s analysis followed the same pattern in 
evaluating Interstate Commerce Commission regulations interpreting the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991105 and Board of 
Immigration Appeals adjudications interpreting the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.106 
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United 
States,107 a nearly unanimous Court (Justice Kagan abstained) altered the 
order of the steps but still treated each as analytically distinct.  The Court 
started first with Chevron Step One, evaluating whether the Internal 
Revenue Code was ambiguous regarding FICA withholding for medical 
residents.108  Concluding it was, and rejecting an alternative, tax-specific 
standard of review,109 the Court then applied Mead‘s steps seriatim to hold 
in favor of Chevron review for Treasury regulations promulgated using 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.110  Finally, the Court considered and 
deferred to Treasury‘s interpretation of the statute under Chevron‘s second 
step.111 
 
 99. 541 U.S. 232 (2004). 
 100. Id. at 238–39. 
 101. Id. at 241. 
 102. Id. at 244–45. 
 103. 555 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 104. Id. at 314–18. 
 105. Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45–46 (2002).  Justice Stevens wrote 
a concurring opinion in the case but did not disagree with the Court‘s Mead analysis. Id. at 
48 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 106. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 513–15 (2009). 
 107. 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
 108. Id. at 711. 
 109. Whether Department of Treasury regulations interpreting the Internal Revenue Code 
should be evaluated under a pre-Chevron, tax-specific standard of review articulated in 
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979), rather than 
Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore was a key issue in the Mayo case. Id. at 710–14. 
 110. Id. at 714. 
 111. Id. at 714–15. 
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Even some more controversial cases exhibit this approach.  In National 
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,112 the 
Court addressed an issue that had long divided courts and scholars—
whether a lower court‘s stare decisis fealty to its own precedents could 
trump Chevron deference.113  The Court divided six to three, and the 
justices wrote four separate opinions.  In particular, Justices Breyer114 and 
Scalia115 wrote concurring and dissenting opinions, respectively, in which 
they argued about the proper interpretation of Mead.  Yet, writing for the 
majority, Justice Thomas seemed to find the issue an easy one to resolve 
under a step-by-step application of Mead:  (1) the Communications Act 
gives the FCC broad rulemaking authority, and (2) the FCC exercised that 
authority when it used notice-and-comment rulemaking to adopt the 
interpretation at issue, hence (3) Chevron provided the right standard.116  
Subsequent sections of Justice Thomas‘s opinion then concluded that the 
statute was ambiguous at Chevron Step One117 and that the agency‘s 
interpretation was reasonable at Chevron Step Two.118 
B.   A More Blended Approach 
A second line of the Court‘s post-Mead rhetoric reflects a substantially 
more fluid approach to judicial deference to agency statutory 
interpretations.  Although not precisely articulated thusly, this model seems 
to envision Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore collectively as embracing a 
single, unified doctrine that asks simply whether Congress would want a 
reviewing court to defer to the agency interpretation at issue.  To answer 
that question, this approach considers Mead‘s emphasis on the presence or 
absence of delegated power as merely identifying another element—along 
with traditional tools of statutory construction and the various Skidmore 
factors—that may be relevant in discerning congressional intent regarding 
deference.  To some extent, this view of deference doctrine resembles 
Justice Scalia‘s ―th‘ol‘ ‗totality of the circumstances‘‖119 critique from 
Mead.  Though harder to depict, one might envision this approach as 
generating a word cloud for each case:  When one assembles the picture, 
what pops out, and does it favor deference or counsel against it? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 112. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 113. Id. at 982–83. 
 114. Id. at 1003–05 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 115. Id. at 1005–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 980–81 (majority opinion). 
 117. Id. at 989. 
 118. Id. at 997. 
 119. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Figure 2.  The Word Cloud. 
Justice Breyer‘s many opinions on the matter clearly espouse this 
approach.  Recall, for example, his claim in Christensen that Chevron did 
not alter Skidmore but merely identified delegation as an additional factor to 
consider.120  He also insisted in Barnhart that Christensen did not 
absolutely prohibit Chevron deference for the listed informal guidance, and 
that factors like subject matter and statutory complexity are at least as 
important as the procedures the agency followed.121  Some of Justice 
Breyer‘s other opinions follow a similar theme. 
For example, in the Brand X case discussed above, although Justice 
Thomas‘s majority opinion followed a rather rote decision tree analysis in 
extending Chevron deference to FCC notice-and-comment rulemaking,122 
Justice Breyer‘s concurring opinion described Mead a little differently.123  
He highlighted language from Mead that ―delegation ‗may be shown in a 
variety of ways, as by an agency‘s power to engage in adjudication or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a 
comparable congressional intent,‘‖ and also that the Court ―has recognized 
a variety of indicators that Congress would expect Chevron deference.‖124  
Procedure is not dispositive, Justice Breyer says, ―because Congress may 
have intended not to leave the matter of a particular interpretation up to the 
agency, irrespective of the procedure the agency uses to arrive at that 
interpretation, say, where an unusually basic legal question is at issue.‖125 
In Carcieri v. Salazar,126 in which a majority of the Court found the 
meaning of the statute clear,127 Justice Breyer in concurrence found the 
statute ambiguous.128  He did not dispute that Congress generally had 
tasked the agency with administering the statute at issue.129  Justice Breyer 
did not, however, turn explicitly to Mead‘s second step, for example by 
 
 120. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 121. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221–22 (2002). 
 122. See Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 
(2005). 
 123. Id. at 1003–04 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. at 1004 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 227, 237). 
 125. Id. at 1006 (emphasis added). 
 126. 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 396 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 129. Id. 
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evaluating the format in which the agency offered its interpretation.  Instead 
he offered a different line of reasoning containing elements of both Chevron 
and Skidmore.  He observed that Skidmore did not support the agency‘s 
interpretation because the agency had been inconsistent.130  Justice Breyer 
also noted that Chevron did not help the agency because the interpretative 
question was ―of considerable importance,‖ and the ―legislative history 
makes clear that Congress focused directly upon‖ the relevant language, yet 
―nothing in that history indicates that Congress believed departmental 
expertise should subsequently play a role‖ in resolving the issue.131  ―These 
circumstances,‖ Justice Breyer opined, ―indicate that Congress did not 
intend to delegate interpretive authority to the Department.  Consequently, 
its interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference, despite linguistic 
ambiguity.‖132 
Perhaps the most extensive articulation of Justice Breyer‘s approach is 
his concurring opinion in City of Arlington v. FCC.133  The majority and 
dissenting opinions in that case might be characterized as arguing over a 
statute-by-statute or provision-by-provision approach to assessing 
congressional delegation at Mead Step One.134  By contrast, Justice Breyer 
offered a laundry list of elements for a reviewing court to consider in 
deciding whether to defer to the agency.  Delegation was mentioned, 
followed by traditional tools of statutory construction and an assessment of 
statutory ambiguity, though ―the existence of statutory ambiguity is 
sometimes not enough to warrant the conclusion that Congress has left a 
deference-warranting gap for the agency to fill because . . . other, 
sometimes context-specific, factors will on occasion prove relevant.‖135  
Quoting Barnhart v. Walton, he called again for considering ―the interstitial 
nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the 
importance of the question to administration of the statute . . . and the 
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period 
of time.‖136  He also described the ―distance‖ of the relevant provision‘s 
subject matter ―from the agency‘s ordinary statutory duties‖ as potentially 
―relevant.‖137  Continuing, he added: 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 396–97. 
 132. Id. at 397. 
 133. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 134. At least, writing for the majority, Justice Scalia characterized the dissenters‘ 
argument in City of Arlington this way, claiming that the dissent would require a reviewing 
court to ―search provision-by-provision to determine whether [a congressional] delegation 
covers the specific provision and particular question before the court.‖ Id. at 1874 (majority 
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).  By contrast, Justice Scalia arguably 
substantiated Chevron‘s applicability (without directly citing Mead) by documenting that 
Congress had given general rulemaking authority over the statute to the FCC, observing that 
said rulemaking authority extended to the statutory language at issue in the case, and noting 
that the FCC relied on that authority in promulgating the challenged ruling. Id. at 1866–67; 
see also Andrew M. Grossman, City of Arlington v. FCC:  Justice Scalia’s Triumph, 2013 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 331 (characterizing the parties‘ arguments in this way). 
 135. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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Moreover, the statute‘s text, its context, the structure of the statutory 
scheme, and canons of textual construction are relevant in determining 
whether the statute is ambiguous and can be equally helpful in 
determining whether such ambiguity comes accompanied with agency 
authority to fill a gap with an interpretation that carries force of law.  
Statutory purposes, including those revealed in part by legislative and 
regulatory history, can be similarly relevant.138 
Finally, citing Skidmore, Justice Breyer mentioned that, even if Congress 
would not have wanted the agency rather than the court to resolve the 
particular ambiguity in question, the agency‘s interpretation still might be 
persuasive given the agency‘s expertise.139 
The extent to which Justice Breyer has persuaded others toward his 
vision is unclear.  Although several justices have written opinions that seem 
to follow the decision tree model to Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore, no other 
justice has so clearly embraced the more blended approach advocated by 
Justice Breyer.  The closest may be Justice Stevens, who authored an 
opinion in Negusie v. Holder, joined by Justice Breyer, describing 
―Chevron‘s domain‖ as including agency rules that address ―central legal 
issues‖ and agency adjudications that decide ―pure questions of statutory 
construction,‖ but not agency rules that resolve ―interstitial questions‖ and 
agency adjudications that ―apply[] law to fact‖—suggesting the more open-
ended inquiry into delegation reflected in Justice Breyer‘s writings.140  
Also, in Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C.,141 Justice Ginsburg wrote an 
opinion for a unanimous Court that gave Chevron deference to a Social 
Security Administration regulation interpreting the Social Security Act, and 
in so doing noted ―the SSA‘s longstanding interpretation,‖ ―adhered to 
without deviation for many decades,‖ in addition to Congress‘s delegation 
of rulemaking authority and the agency‘s use of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures.142  Justice Ginsburg additionally joined Justice 
Breyer‘s opinion in Christensen v. Harris County.143 
As already noted, Justice Breyer wrote for an overwhelming majority of 
the Court in Barnhart v. Walton, but the more controversial part of his 
opinion was dicta.144  Since then, he has written several opinions of the 
Court that contained at least some discussion of Mead and were joined by 
various combinations of justices, or even all of them.  Those cases involved 
relatively straight-forward applications of Chevron review to notice-and-
comment regulations145 or Skidmore review for informal guidance 
 
 138. Id. at 1876 (citations omitted). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 141. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
 142. Id. at 2033–34. 
 143. 529 U.S. 576, 598 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 144. See supra notes 72–81 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007); Global Crossing 
Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S. 45 (2007); Zuni Pub. Sch. 
Dist. No. 89 v. Dep‘t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90 (2007).  In United States v. Home Concrete 
& Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012), the government claimed Chevron deference for a 
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documents,146 with little or no opposition regarding the standard of 
review.147  Moreover, none of those opinions offered particularly extensive 
discussions of Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore.  Some of Justice Breyer‘s 
colleagues may have joined those opinions because they agree with 
everything he said, including a stray remark here or there about Mead and 
Chevron‘s scope, but others may have decided that the stray remarks were 
dicta and not worth writing separately to disagree.  Meanwhile, outside of 
Christensen and Barnhart, no other justice joined Justice Breyer‘s extended 
and eloquent discussions of Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore in Brand X, 
Carcieri, and City of Arlington. 
C.   Justice Scalia Stands Alone 
Justice Scalia clearly holds his own view of Chevron that eschews both 
Mead and Skidmore.  He regards the former as inessential at best and the 
latter as anachronistic.  Since his dissent in Mead, Justice Scalia continues 
to criticize Mead and its progeny,148 call upon the Court to overrule 
Mead,149 and otherwise mock his colleagues‘ rhetoric concerning 
deference.150  Although Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in City 
of Arlington,151 which could be characterized as a case about Mead‘s first 
step,152 he completely avoided any mention of Mead until responding to the 
dissent‘s framing of the case as a Mead issue.153 
Instead, Justice Scalia advocates a regime of Chevron review for all 
―authoritative‖ agency interpretations and no deference for any other 
agency pronouncements.154  He is less clear about exactly which agency 
interpretations count as authoritative, offering individual examples but not a 
 
regulation with arguable procedural irregularities, but the Court rejected the government‘s 
deference claim on the ground that the meaning of the statute was clear. 
 146. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 147. Justice Scalia challenged the fuzziness of Justice Breyer‘s rhetoric in Kasten but 
would not have deferred regardless. Id. at 1339–40 & nn.5–6 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 148. E.g., Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
1016–18 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority‘s ―novel‖ solution to a 
problem allegedly created by Mead); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 245 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing Mead for creating ―unduly constrained standards of 
agency deference‖). 
 149. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 296 
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―I favor overruling Mead.  Failing that, I am pleased to join 
an opinion that effectively ignores it.‖); Smith, 544 U.S. at 245 (claiming continued 
adherence to ―the pre-Mead formulation of Chevron‖). 
 150. E.g., Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1340 n.5 (criticizing majority for citing Mead without 
specifically deferring under either Chevron or Skidmore); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1016, 1017 
(seeing irony in the majority‘s rejection of the agency‘s construction while simultaneously 
permitting the agency to promulgate a new regulation that would contradict the Court‘s 
interpretation). 
 151. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 152. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 153. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874. 
 154. E.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 601–02 (2004) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 590–91 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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comprehensive definition.155  Justice Scalia‘s conception of Chevron 
obviously extends to more agency actions than just notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and formal adjudication.  In Christensen, he cited favorably 
previous Court decisions extending Chevron review to informal 
adjudications and a ―longstanding‖ FDA interpretation reflected in an FDA 
policy statement; acknowledged that a Department of Labor Wage and 
Hour Division opinion letter alone might not be sufficiently authoritative; 
but said that the opinion letter plus an amicus brief cosigned by the Solicitor 
of Labor would be, as would the amicus brief alone.156  In Raymond B. 
Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon,157 Justice Scalia similarly 
described an amicus brief signed by the Solicitor of Labor and supported by 
a years-old Department of Labor advisory opinion as authoritative and 
deserving Chevron deference.  As Justice Scalia elsewhere has labeled 
factors like longevity and consistency as unnecessary for Chevron 
deference generally, it is unclear to what extent those factors play into his 
assessment of Chevron eligibility.  And, as Justice Breyer typically blends 
the various elements of Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore into a single inquiry, 
it is difficult to discern whether Justice Scalia‘s authoritativeness approach 
is broader or narrower in scope. 
Regardless, beyond his known preference for simplifying judicial 
doctrine generally,158 Justice Scalia‘s willingness to apply Chevron review 
so broadly may be at least partly related to his approach to Chevron analysis 
overall.  Specifically, Justice Scalia has stated publicly his view that there 
are not many cases in which he cannot employ traditional tools of statutory 
construction to find a statute‘s clearly preferable meaning.159  His approach 
to Chevron Step Two, when he gets there, seems to follow a heavily 
textualist, traditional-tools approach as well.160  Accordingly, there are 
comparatively few cases in which Justice Scalia would ever need to defer to 
the agency‘s interpretation.161  (Hence, too, his apparent agreement with 
Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule that Chevron review really has 
 
 155. E.g., Christensen, 529 U.S. at 590–91 (listing examples from precedents and 
discussing opinion letters and amicus briefs). 
 156. Id. at 590–91. 
 157. 541 U.S. 1, 24–25 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 158. See generally, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175, 1178–81 (1989) (discussing his preference for adopting clear rules to govern 
judicial decision making rather than deciding cases based on the ―totality of the 
circumstances‖); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism:  The “New” New Legal 
Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1634 (1990) (―Much of [Justice Scalia‘s] jurisprudence 
now seems built on the supposed separation of law and policy and the need to have bright-
line rules to allow for predictability and restraint in judging.‖). 
 159. Scalia, supra note 9, at 521. 
 160. Justice Scalia has written three opinions for the Court concluding that, while the 
statutes at issue were ambiguous, the agency‘s interpretation was nevertheless not among the 
textually reasonable alternatives. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 
2442–45 (2014); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731–32 (2006); AT&T Corp. v. 
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999). 
 161. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731–39; AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 387–92. 
2014] THE THREE PHASES OF MEAD 547 
only one step.162)  In those few cases in which Justice Scalia cannot resolve 
statutory meaning using traditional tools, the choice between competing 
interpretations will be most obviously driven by policy choice, agency 
expertise will be at its zenith, and judicial expertise likely will be at its 
nadir.  Under such conditions, so long as Justice Scalia is satisfied that the 
interpretation at issue is both sufficiently official to represent the decided 
views of key agency personnel, he is usually happy to extend Chevron 
deference.  By comparison, Justice Scalia‘s colleagues typically seem more 
prepared to find statutes to be ambiguous and move on to Chevron Step 
Two, which may explain why they are more concerned with limiting the 
scope of Chevron‘s applicability. 
Ultimately, however, the primary obstacle to Justice Scalia‘s approach to 
Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore is his colleagues‘ refusal to subscribe to his 
view.  Notably, even when they join his concurring or dissenting opinions 
more generally, the other justices will decline to join the parts that criticize 
Mead.163 
III.   IMPLICATIONS 
Consistent with the complaints of Mead critics, the Court‘s vacillating 
rhetoric about the interaction of Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore has 
undoubtedly sowed some amount of confusion.  It is unclear, however, that 
the practical impact of that confusion has been especially great. 
For all of the Court‘s rhetorical inconsistency, much of its Mead 
jurisprudence is pretty unremarkable, at least as regards Mead itself.  A 
quick survey shows that, over thirteen Terms, thirty-nine Supreme Court 
cases offer opinions that cite Mead.164  Only a few of those cases featured 
clearly articulated disagreements among the justices over the standard of 
review to be applied.  Brand X and City of Arlington, both discussed above, 
were particularly contentious, with the phases of Mead all spectacularly 
displayed.  In Gonzales v. Oregon,165 Justice Scalia was joined by Justices 
Roberts and Thomas in objecting to the majority‘s evaluation of a 
Department of Justice interpretative rule under Skidmore rather than 
Chevron, although he also found the rule to offer ―the most natural 
 
 162. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 & n.1 (2012) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the only significant question for Chevron analysis is 
whether the agency‘s interpretation is reasonable, and that a separate inquiry into statutory 
ambiguity is ―a waste of time,‖ and citing Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 95). 
 163. E.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Thomas, except for footnote 6, in which Justice 
Scalia criticized Christensen and Mead as ―incoherent‖); Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n 
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1005–14 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg, but not with respect to the part of the opinion in which Justice 
Scalia criticized Mead). 
 164. I determined this statistic with a simple Keycite of the Mead decision in Westlaw.  
That Keycite yields forty hits, but one is to a memorandum opinion in which the Court 
merely remanded a case back to the Seventh Circuit for reconsideration in light of Mead. 
Household Int‘l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan v. Matz, 533 U.S. 925 (2001). 
 165. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
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interpretation‖ as well.166  In Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing 
Plan v. Hendon, Justice Scalia alone thought that Chevron rather than 
Skidmore should apply in evaluating a Department of Labor advisory 
opinion.167 
By comparison, most of the cases in which the Court cited Mead offered 
little or no disagreement in either extending Chevron review to obviously 
eligible notice-and-comment rulemaking168 and formal169 (or formal-ish)170 
adjudications and applying Skidmore to informal guidance171 and similarly 
nonbinding interpretations.172  Indeed, post-Mead, the Court has never 
actually extended Chevron deference to interpretations lacking with notice-
and-comment rulemaking or relatively formal adjudication procedures. 
That said, the Court may have deliberately dodged Mead issues in some 
instances.  In several cases, the majority avoided applying any of Mead, 
 
 166. Id. at 281–84 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 167. 541 U.S. 1, 24 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 168. See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014); Astrue 
v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United 
States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011); Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009); Long 
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007); Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. 
v. Metrophones Telecomm., Inc., 550 U.S. 45 (2007); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep‘t 
of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007); Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232 (2004); 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 
537 U.S. 36 (2002); see also Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 
U.S. 261 (2009) (describing EPA regulations as Chevron-eligible before evaluating guidance 
interpreting regulations under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1996)); Barnhart v. Walton, 
535 U.S. 212 (2002) (applying Chevron to notice-and-comment rulemaking unanimously 
even while disagreeing over dicta). 
 169. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
 170. See United States v. Eurodif, S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (2009).  Although the Department 
of Commerce antidumping adjudication in Eurodif seems not to have followed the formal 
procedures prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, the government‘s brief 
established the statutory delegation of decision-making authority to agency and relative 
formality of the agency‘s procedures. Brief for Petitioner, Eurodif, 555 U.S. 511 (Nos. 07-
1059, 07-1078), 2008 WL 2794014, at *23–24; see also Lucius B. Lau, Agency 
Interpretations of the Statute After Mead with a Special Emphasis on the Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Laws, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 223, 234–37 (2002) (justifying Chevron review 
for analogous adjudications under Mead). 
 171. Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 1391 (2013) (agency memorandum and 
letter); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (EEOC 
compliance manual and Department of Labor litigation briefs); Alaska Dep‘t of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (EPA guidance memoranda); Wash. State Dep‘t 
of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003) (claims 
processing instruction manual). 
 172. Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008) (proposed regulation); Wis. Dep‘t of Health & 
Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (2002) (proposed regulation in addition to regional 
guidance letter); see also Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2169 
(2012) (applying Skidmore standard to agency legal briefs interpreting agency regulations 
after declining to extend Auer deference); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (declining 
to defer to agency statements regarding state law preemption); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 
U.S. 312, 326–27 (2008) (finding statutory meaning clear but conceding dissent‘s statement 
that Skidmore would provide the standard for evaluating FDA amicus brief). 
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Chevron, or Skidmore by finding the statute‘s meaning clear.173  In a few of 
these cases, the Court explicitly reserved or declined to resolve the Mead 
issue.174  In other instances, the Court simply resolved the statutory 
question without relying on any of Mead, Chevron or Skidmore, 
notwithstanding party briefs or concurring or dissenting opinions discussing 
those cases.175  Regardless, the fact remains that the justices managed to 
agree about Mead‘s application substantially more often than they 
disagreed. 
Far more important, given the limited size of the Court‘s docket, is how 
the justices‘ differing views of Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore have 
influenced the federal circuit courts.  Are they just as divided?  Have the 
Court‘s varying rhetorical flourishes yielded the muddled doctrinal mess 
predicted by Justice Scalia? 
Although admittedly based only on informal impressions rather than 
empirical analysis, contrary to Mead‘s critics, I would assert that Mead 
overall has had a stabilizing effect on the lower courts‘ Chevron 
jurisprudence.  More often than not, the circuit courts of appeals seem to 
follow a relatively rote version of the decision tree model of Mead, 
Chevron, and Skidmore, rather than the more fluid and open-ended version 
advocated by Justice Breyer.  While this approach is not always doctrinally 
precise and unanswered questions remain, it is also relatively easy to apply 
and yields consistent outcomes in most cases.  That said, hard cases exist, 
and the Court‘s rhetorical waffling complicates their resolution.  Moreover, 
the downside of the circuit courts‘ approach to the decision tree model is 
that it is often ill-suited to resolve those hard cases. 
A.   Easy Cases 
To a great extent, the circuit courts have made Mead work by applying 
the decision tree model in a particularly rote fashion.176  In applying 
Mead‘s first step, the circuit courts typically look for an explicit statutory 
 
 173. Although Chevron review explicitly calls for a finding of statutory clarity or 
ambiguity, Skidmore analysis implicitly assumes a similar finding. Hickman & Krueger, 
supra note 76, at 1280. 
 174. Two concern Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations interpreting 
Title VII. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004); Edelman v. Lynchburg 
Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002).  A third upheld the method of calculating good time credit used 
by the Bureau of Prisons. Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010); see also Fed. Express 
Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008) (―assum[ing]‖ that EEOC policy statements are 
ineligible for Chevron deference under Mead). 
 175. Lawson v. FMR, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 
2434 (2013); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); Hoffman Plastics Compounds v. 
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002); see also United States 
v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (offering some disagreement 
among the justices regarding relationship among Mead, Chevron, and stare decisis, but 
deciding the case at Chevron Step One and not disagreeing that Treasury Department 
regulations are ordinarily Chevron-eligible); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) 
(plurality of eight participating justices). 
 176. See supra notes 100–18 and accompanying text (illustrating the Supreme Court‘s 
occasionally rote application of the decision tree model). 
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grant of authority to adopt legally binding pronouncements either through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or through formal adjudication.177  
Treating Mead‘s first step as a statute-by-statute inquiry not only comports 
with the Supreme Court‘s decision in City of Arlington,178 but seems also to 
have been the instinct of many circuit courts in cases before that and, in 
conjunction with stare decisis, vastly simplifies Mead Step One.  In fact, 
because many if not most agencies are repeat players in litigation before the 
circuit courts, courts often just cite existing precedent to support Chevron 
versus Skidmore review of particular actions by particular agencies,179 or 
even skip Mead‘s two steps altogether.180 
As regards Mead‘s second step, many circuit courts in practice seem 
quite simply to extend Chevron review to the notice-and-comment 
regulations and formal adjudications mentioned in Christensen and Mead181 
or those informal adjudications for which the Supreme Court has expressly 
extended Chevron deference in other cases,182 and to offer only Skidmore 
 
 177. See, e.g., McMaster v. United States, 731 F.3d 881, 891 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(pointing to statutory rulemaking grant as satisfying Mead’s first step); Wilderness League v. 
EPA, 727 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that EPA regulation promulgated under a 
statutory grant of authority is accorded Chevron deference). 
 178. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 179. E.g., Nat‘l Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA, 754 F.3d 1031, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(citing Nat‘l Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA, 414 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2005), in favor of 
Chevron deference for FLRA interpretation of the Federal Service Labor-Management 
Relations Statute); Akram v. Holder, 721 F.3d 853, 858–59 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Escobar v. 
Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 2011), as supporting Chevron deference for precedential 
Board of Immigration Appeals opinions interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act); 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Dep‘t of Labor, 717 F.3d 1121, 1131 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing 
Mead as well as Trimmer v. Dep‘t of Labor, 174 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 1999), as supporting 
Chevron deference for Administrative Review Board formal adjudications interpreting 
whistleblower protection provisions of Energy Reorganization Act of 1974). 
 180. E.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 754 F.3d 1056, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (extending Chevron review to Surface Transportation Board regulations without 
discussing Mead); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 
F.3d 380, 384 (6th Cir. 2014) (extending Chevron review without elaboration to regulations 
promulgated under express grant of rulemaking authority contained in the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act). 
 181. See, e.g., Lopez v. Terrell, 654 F.3d 176, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2011) (declining to defer 
to Bureau of Prisons Administrative Remedy Program Letter for lack of notice and 
comment); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 799, 805–06 (5th Cir. 2010) (rejecting 
Chevron deference for a Department of Housing and Urban Development policy statement 
for lack of notice and comment); Bradley v. Sebelius, 621 F.3d 1330, 1338 & n.18 (11th Cir. 
2010) (rejecting Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) claim to Chevron 
deference for Medicare field manual lacking notice and comment); Kornman & Assocs. v. 
United States, 527 F.3d 443, 452–53 (5th Cir. 2008) (declining to extend Chevron deference 
for Internal Revenue Service revenue rulings principally due to their lack of notice-and-
comment rulemaking). 
 182. For example, as noted in Mead, the Court previously has deferred to informal 
adjudications by the Officer of the Comptroller of the Currency interpreting the National 
Bank Act. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–32 (2001) (citing NationsBank of 
N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995)).  Since then, at least one 
circuit court has followed suit explicitly because of that precedent. See, e.g., TeamBank, 
N.A. v. McClure, 279 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2002) (declaring Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency adjudication as an ―exception‖ from the ―general rule‖ of giving Chevron 
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respect to virtually any other sort of agency action.183  This approach to 
Mead‘s second step is not quite doctrinally accurate, as the Court expressly 
warned against limiting Chevron‘s scope in this way in Mead and 
Barnhart.184  Nevertheless, generally limiting eligibility for Chevron 
deference to notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudications 
dramatically simplifies Mead‘s application.  Again, except for a few 
instances of not-quite-formal adjudications, the Court has never actually 
applied Mead to extend Chevron deference otherwise.  Consequently, lower 
courts with busy dockets may well anticipate that the Court is unlikely to 
apply Mead differently very often, irrespective of the Court‘s occasional 
rhetoric to the contrary.  Whether or not such an assumption is accurate, it 
also serves to simplify Mead‘s application substantially. 
B.   Hard Cases 
Even circuit court opinions that pursue a more nuanced treatment, 
however, often follow a decision tree–type approach.  For example, one 
emerging trend in the circuit courts is to address deference for informal 
guidance by folding Justice Breyer‘s dicta in Barnhart v. Walton into the 
analysis of Mead Step Two, after the reviewing court already has concluded 
that Congress gave the agency the power to act more formally through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.  For example, in 
Fournier v. Sebelius,185 the Ninth Circuit evaluated whether an 
interpretation of the Medicare Act expressed in a policy guidance letter and 
the Medicare Benefit Policy Manual and implemented through Medicare 
Appeals Council adjudications was eligible for Chevron review.186  The 
court concluded first that the statute was ambiguous regarding the 
interpretive question at issue.187  The court then held that the Department of 
Health and Human Services, under whose authority the interpretations were 
made, clearly satisfied Mead‘s first step, as the Secretary possesses general 
rulemaking authority over the Medicare Act.188  To evaluate Mead‘s second 
step, the court brought into play Justice Breyer‘s language from Barnhart v. 
Walton, characterizing the interpretation as (1) ―interstitial‖; (2) important 
to the agency‘s administration of a complex statute; and (3) longstanding 
and consistent, thus worthy of Chevron deference.189  Finally, the court 
 
deference to only agency actions with ―‗relatively formal‘ administrative procedures‖ 
because of NationsBank). 
 183. E.g., S. Rehab. Grp., PLLC v. Sec‘y of Health & Human Servs., 732 F.3d 670, 685 
(6th Cir. 2013) (Medicare Claims Processing Manual); Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New 
England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 140 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(Pension Benefit Guaranty corporation appeals letter); Vulcan Constr. Materials, LP v. 
FMSHRC, 700 F.3d 297, 316 (7th Cir. 2012) (Department of Labor litigating position); 
Lopes v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 696 F.3d 180, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2012) (HHS amicus brief). 
 184. See supra notes 46–55, 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 185. 718 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 186. Id. at 1118. 
 187. Id. at 1118–19. 
 188. Id. at 1119–20. 
 189. Id. at 1120–22. 
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turned to the reasonableness of the interpretation at Chevron Step Two.190  
In Hagans v. Commissioner of Social Security,191 the Third Circuit applied 
a similarly tiered approach to conclude that a Social Security Acquiescence 
Ruling was eligible only for Skidmore review before rejecting the 
interpretation contained therein as poorly explained.192 
Nevertheless, the opening for nuance that Barnhart provides, particularly 
when combined with the Court‘s rhetorical inconsistencies, makes some 
disagreement about Mead‘s application inevitable.  For example, although 
the Court has made clear that decisions of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) carry the force of law and are Chevron-eligible, the circuit 
courts have struggled to determine whether the same is true for 
interpretations designated by the BIA as nonprecedential.  The Seventh 
Circuit initially extended Chevron deference to such interpretations.193  
Other circuits have accorded only Skidmore review,194 prompting the 
Seventh Circuit subsequently to change its mind.195  Meanwhile, still other 
circuits have reserved the question.196  Similarly, the Court‘s refusal to 
opine definitively has allowed space for the Ninth Circuit to give Chevron 
deference to EEOC Compliance Manual interpretations of Title VII,197 even 
as other circuits have declined to do so.198 
Moreover, even a more nuanced version of the decision tree model is 
sufficiently rigid that it arguably leads to questionable resolutions of some 
issues of Mead‘s applicability and Chevron‘s scope.  Indeed, it is in these 
instances that the decision tree most clearly resembles the ―ugly and 
improbable structure‖ of which Justice Scalia has complained.199 
In other work, I have documented the troubling examples of temporary 
Treasury regulations adopted without good cause and only post-
promulgation notice and comment procedures, as well as IRS guidance 
documents that lack notice-and-comment rulemaking but nevertheless 
potentially subject taxpayers to penalties for noncompliance.200  Often, the 
Treasury Department and IRS use these formats in reacting to transactions 
or litigation positions to which they object, raising concerns about 
arbitrariness.201  Treasury and the IRS clearly possess the authority to act 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. 694 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 192. Id. at 303. 
 193. See Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 194. See Cordoba v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013); Dhuka v. Holder, 716 F.3d 
149 (5th Cir. 2013); Quinchia v. Att‘y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1258–59 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 195. Arobelidze v. Holder, 653 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 196. E.g., Dobrova v. Holder, 607 F.3d 297, 300 (2d Cir. 2010); Cervantes v. Holder, 597 
F.3d 299, 233 n.5 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 197. E.g., Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 503 F.3d 947, 953 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 198. See, e.g., Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012); Noviello 
v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2005); Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 
103 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 199. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1847 (2012) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 200. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013). 
 201. Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax 
Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643 (2012). 
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with the force of law and assert the right to assess penalties for 
noncompliance with either format.202  After years of claiming Chevron 
deference for both temporary Treasury regulations and IRS guidance 
documents, the IRS now accepts Skidmore review for the latter.203  The 
circuit courts have struggled with both positions.204 
A doctrinally faithful application of the decision tree model more likely 
leads to Chevron review for temporary Treasury regulations and IRS 
guidance documents.205  That conclusion is arguably troubling because of 
the lack of procedure attending those otherwise routine IRS actions.  
Applying the Skidmore standard rather than Chevron might seem more 
appropriate in the abstract, giving reviewing courts greater flexibility to 
take into account both formats‘ admittedly arguable procedural failings.  
Under the decision tree model, however, such an outcome would be 
doctrinally inaccurate. 
In short, applying the decision tree model of Mead, Chevron, and 
Skidmore to these more challenging circumstances is awkward.  Justice 
Breyer‘s more fluid approach to judicial deference doctrine might yield a 
more satisfying outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
The point of this Essay is not to suggest that the Court‘s Mead 
jurisprudence is crystal clear and flawless.  The justices‘ shifting rhetoric 
makes its adherence to and application of Mead seem much more fickle 
than it is and, further, is highly frustrating to lower court judges, litigants, 
and commentators who seek consistency in the Court‘s guidance.  Hard 
cases exist and contribute to the sense of doctrinal uncertainty surrounding 
Mead. 
Yet Supreme Court jurisprudence is often challenging in this way.  The 
Court‘s job is to take the hard cases that present novel doctrinal challenges.   
Standards of review are not precise instruments in any event.  
Consequently, the Court‘s vacillating rhetoric and the justices‘ different 
views regarding Mead in marginal cases do not necessarily mean that Mead 
is a failed doctrine—particularly when the justices agree substantially more 
often than they disagree.   
Moreover, as this Essay demonstrates, there is some method in the 
madness.  Even if the Court collectively is somewhat inconsistent in its 
rhetoric, individual justices are more predictable.  And notwithstanding the 
Court‘s rhetorical inconsistency and occasional difficulties in applying 
Mead, the courts seem to have made Mead work more consistently across a 
majority of cases than Mead‘s critics contend.  That relative consistency 
thus far seems to be an improvement over the doctrinal mess regarding 
 
 202. Hickman, supra note 200, at 526–29. 
 203. Id. at 501–02, 507–08. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 529. 
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Chevron‘s scope that existed prior to Mead.  Perhaps that ought to be 
enough. 
 
